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Introduction 
I am honored to be included among the jurists and scholars who 
have delivered this lecture. I clerked for one of them, Judge Alex 
Kozinski, back in the early 1990s. When Judge Kozinski spoke here 
about twenty years ago, he started by asking his audience to picture 
the judicial system as “a large snake that feeds largely on field mice 
and occasional squirrel and maybe a game hen here or there.”1 Even 
twenty years later, Judge Kozinski is a hard act to follow.  
I have been a judge for seven years, but no field mice or game hen 
for me. I have been on the D.C. Circuit—the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit—which has a distinctive 
history and docket really captured by the title of this lecture and 
Article, The Courts and the Administrative State. I will start by telling 
you a little bit about the background of the D.C. Circuit, how our court 
works, and then I will talk briefly about three of our most important 
responsibilities: (1) interpreting statutes that are administered by 
administrative agencies; (2) enforcing the Constitution’s separation of 
 
*  This Article is adapted from the 2013 Sumner Canary Lecture, delivered 
by Judge Kavanaugh on October 1, 2013, at Case Western Reserve 
University School of Law.  
†  Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. 
1. See Alex Kozinski & Sean Gallagher, Death: The Ultimate Run-on 
Sentence, 46 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1, 5 (1995) (adapted from Judge 
Kozinski’s Sumner Canary Lecture). 
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powers principle and resolving disputes between the legislative and 
executive branches; and (3) deciding cases during wartime. 
I. Background of the D.C. Circuit Court 
A. Location 
One distinctive aspect of the D.C. Circuit is our location. We are 
about halfway between the White House and the Capitol, which is 
fitting for the work we do. Even better, our front door is on 
Constitution Avenue. What could be better than to say, “I work on 
Constitution Avenue.”  
And I love being in the courthouse with the district court judges 
and the other judges on the D.C. Circuit. Our building houses not only 
all the federal judges from both the court of appeals and the district 
court but also a judge’s lunchroom where we all eat together and talk 
about the events of the day, sports, or what is going on at Capitol Hill. 
Judicial salary might come up once in a while. But developing 
relationships with other judges and learning about their backgrounds 
are some of the great aspects of being on this court, or on any court. 
Of course, we don’t talk about pending cases. But after a reversal of 
the district court, the court of appeals judges tend to avoid the 
lunchroom for a few days. You can imagine how the conversation goes 
when you ask the district judge how his or her day is going, and the 
district judge is clearly thinking, “Did you have to say I abused my 
discretion? Did you have to say I didn’t just ‘err’ but that I ‘clearly 
erred’?” On those days, a peanut butter and jelly at the desk works 
just fine. 
My personal background of growing up in Washington, D.C.—
which is rare2—makes for especially interesting interactions. It is always 
amusing as a judge—even now I have been on the bench for seven 
years—how people treat you when you are a judge on the D.C. Circuit. 
I think it falls into two categories: those who knew you before you were 
a judge and those who have only known you after you became a judge. 
The second group is very respectful, very deferential, usually addressing 
me formally as “Your Honor.” But the first group, my old friends, will 
say “judge,” but it is usually “judge?” in a tone of amusement. Someone 
I have known for a long time—one of my old friends, with whom I had 
worked a long time ago—had to argue in our court recently. I told my 
clerks afterward, “You know, it is really hard to do an oral argument 
like this guy did and do it so well. It is hard to do an oral argument 
when you are looking up at the bench and saying to yourself, ‘I can’t 
believe this guy is a federal judge.’”  
 
2. On our court of appeals, only one other judge grew up in the Washington, 
D.C. area. 
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B. Appointment Process 
1. Overview and Personal Experience 
Another distinctive aspect of the D.C. Circuit is the fact that we 
are a national court in some respects. It is a function of the appointment 
process. Think about the appointment process for other courts of 
appeals; the President—the White House—has to work with the two 
senators for the state whose citizenry has traditionally filled a circuit 
judgeship. If either of the two home-state senators objects to a nominee, 
that’s it. It is called the blue-slip process, an old tradition in the Senate, 
and the nominee will not go forward.  
That doesn’t happen on the D.C. Circuit. There are obviously no 
home-state senators involved in the process in the D.C. Circuit. That 
frees up the President to choose judges from all over the country, a 
national pool with different kinds of experiences. We have on our court 
now a former Senate legal counsel; a former justice of the California 
Supreme Court; a former judge on D.C.’s highest court; former district 
court judges from North Carolina and South Carolina; former law 
professors from Michigan, Colorado, Harvard; several former high-level 
Justice Department officials; and a former Deputy Solicitor General. A 
range of geographic backgrounds, intellectual backgrounds, and 
professional experiences are represented, and I think this is distinctive 
of the D.C. Circuit. 
For my part, I came from the White House most immediately before 
my appointment and before that, private practice in Washington. I 
worked at the White House for five and a half years before becoming a 
judge. Now, it is fair to say that certain senators were not entirely sold 
that working at the White House is the best launching pad for a 
position in the Article III branch. One senator at my hearing didn’t like 
the idea that I had been working in the White House and would be 
coming to work in the judiciary, and he said in the hearing “[this] is 
not just a drop of salt in the partisan wounds, it is the whole shaker.” 
But this is where you need your mother at the confirmation hearing, 
because my mom afterward said to me “I think he really respects you,” 
as only a mom can. 
But White House service, it turns out, is very useful for a job on 
the D.C. Circuit. It gives you great respect, first of all, for the 
presidency, the demands of the executive branch, and the burdens of 
the presidency. But at the same time, it gives you perspectives that 
might be unexpected to some. Such experience helps refine your ability 
to determine whether the executive branch might be exaggerating or 
overstating how things actually work and the problems that would 
supposedly arise under certain legal interpretations. White House 
experience also helps—and history shows that executive branch 
experience helps—when judges need to show some fortitude and 
backbone in those cases where the independent judiciary has to stand 
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up to the mystique of the presidency and the executive branch. 
Fortitude and backbone are important characteristics, I think, for our 
court and courts generally in our separation of powers structure. Of 
course, we all think of Justice Robert Jackson in the Youngstown case, 
a role model for all executive branch lawyers turned judges.  
2. Challenges and Proposed Reform 
Our court has a distinctive composition because of the way the 
selection process works and a distinctive nominations process because 
we do not have home state senators involved in the process. But we 
still have a confirmation process for our court, and, although no home-
state senators are involved, nominations to the D.C. Circuit have been 
contentious for the last twenty years or so. There are several 
extraordinary people who were nominated to the D.C. Circuit but never 
confirmed. Even for those who have been confirmed, the process has 
been beset by years of delays.  
I saw this firsthand when I worked in the Bush White House. 
Nominees were held up for years without hearings or votes, and the 
same thing happened during the Clinton Administration and, to some 
extent, during the Obama Administration. The best examples to show 
this are the D.C. Circuit nominations of now–Chief Justice John 
Roberts and now-Justice Elena Kagan. Chief Justice Roberts was first 
nominated to the D.C. Circuit in 1992, renominated in 2001, and did 
not get through for another two years until he was finally confirmed in 
2003. Justice Kagan was nominated to the D.C. Circuit in 1999. But 
she never got through. It turns out for both of them it was much easier 
to get confirmed to the Supreme Court than to the D.C. Circuit, which 
shows that something is wrong, I think, with the confirmation process. 
I think something is wrong in not just the confirmation process for 
our court but for lower courts more generally. A nominee’s confirmation 
may not happen for up to three years. This leaves seats vacant too long, 
overburdens judges on certain courts, and is unfair to the individual 
nominees. Moreover, the delays have systemic effects and deter talented 
people from wanting to become judges. We want to design a system, I 
think, that encourages good people to want to be judges. During the 
Clinton and George W. Bush Administrations, then–Chief Justice 
William Rehnquist discussed the delays3 and their effect of discouraging 
private practice attorneys in particular from wanting to be federal 
judges. 
There is a better way to do this, I think. As Presidents Clinton and 
Bush have suggested, the executive branch and the Senate should work 
 
3.  See, e.g., William H. Rehnquist, The 1997 Year-End Report of 
the Federal Judiciary (1998), reprinted in 1 State of the Fed. 
Judiciary: Annual Reports of the Chief Justice of the Supreme 
Court of the U.S. lxxxviii, 7–8 (Shelley L. Dowling ed., 2013) 
[hereinafter Annual Reports]. 
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together on ground rules that would apply regardless of the President’s 
party or who controls the Senate. Thus, no matter whether the 
President is Democratic or Republican, no matter whether the Senate 
is controlled by Democrats or by Republicans, you have the same 
ground rules for how nominations will be considered. There are four 
permutations, and the rules should be the same for any of the four. 
My personal view is that the Senate should require a vote on all 
judicial nominees within six months of nomination. That would provide 
a set ground rule for how the Senate would consider the nominees. Now, 
it is not my place to say whether that should be a majority vote or 
what the Senate calls—in Washington speak—a cloture vote that 
requires sixty votes for something to happen. But either way, the Senate 
in my view should establish a strict time limit so that the process will 
come to a final determination within a set amount of time.  
Now, changing the ground rules in the middle of a presidency is 
very hard. Why? Because everyone is affected by the current 
permutation. But that is always going to be the case, and I don’t think 
after the Clinton Administration, the Bush Administration, or now the 
Obama Administration, throwing up our hands presidency after 
presidency makes much sense. But the problem, although it is 
admittedly not the highest-profile problem in the United States, is an 
important problem for the administration of justice. We should not just 
continue to have this problem and continue to live with it. Certainly, 
there is no reason the problem couldn’t be squared away, for example, 
by 2017, even if it means adopting rules now that wouldn’t take effect 
until the next presidency.  
So I think all of us who care about the quality of the federal bench 
and the administration of justice—and that certainly includes all of us 
in this room—should do what we can to help promote the idea that the 
Senate should adopt ground rules for lower court nominations that are 
firmly established, are consistently applied, fill the courts, are fair to 
the nominees, and attract really good people to be judges.  
II. The D.C. Circuit’s Important Responsibilities  
A. Administrative Law Docket and Statutory Interpretation 
So enough about how judges get on to the D.C. Circuit and about 
the problems with getting on the D.C. Circuit. What do we do once we 
are there? And the second aspect of the D.C. Circuit I want to discuss, 
really the bread and butter of our docket, is our administrative law 
docket. What I mean by that is determining in a particular case 
whether an administrative agency, like the EPA, the NLRB, or the 
FCC, exceeded statutory limits on their authority or violated a 
statutory prohibition on what they can do. These are the cases that 
come up to our court constantly. We see very complicated 
administrative records, and we adjudicate very complex statutes.  
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But what I have seen in my seven years and what my experience 
before that told me—but really what I have seen since I have been a 
judge—is that these cases oftentimes come down to what Justice Felix 
Frankfurter used to describe as the three rules of resolving these kinds 
of cases: “(1) Read the statute; (2) read the statute; (3) read the 
statute!”4 So the most important factor in resolving these 
administrative cases often turns out to be the precise wording of the 
statutory text. If you sat in our courtroom for a week or two and 
listened to case after case—I don’t advise this for anyone who wants to 
stay sane—what you would hear is judges from across the so-called 
ideological spectrum, different judicial philosophies, from all different 
backgrounds, Democratic appointees, Republican appointees, you 
would hear them inquiring, “What does the statute say? What is the 
precise wording of the statutory provision at issue?” And this is a real 
contrast to how statutory interpretation and administrative law were 
done thirty, twenty-five years ago when there were a lot more references 
to the purpose that Congress might have had in mind, to statements of 
individual members of Congress and Senators, to committee reports, 
and to floor debates. 
And the change is due in large part generally to the influence 
coming from the Supreme Court and, most particularly, to Justice 
Antonin Scalia’s influence on statutory interpretation, but it is broader 
than that, I think. It is because both formalists—Justice Scalia a 
formalist—and also functionalists, people who think about the 
congressional process and how it results in legislation, have come to 
realize the centrality of the statutory text to statutory interpretation.  
And so formalists, the Justice Scalia model, focus on the text 
because that is what was passed by both houses of Congress and signed 
by the President. Under that view, the Constitution requires us to look 
at the text when resolving cases, not what might have been in the 
committee report. But functionalists, I think, have come also to 
realize—I credit a lot of people with this, Professor John Manning and 
others—that text must matter because legislation reflects a 
compromise. This is something I saw when I worked in the White 
House. Legislation is never one person sitting down and writing out a 
piece of legislation. It is the House, the Senate, and the executive 
branch—different parts of the House and Senate, different political 
parties—which write these laws together, and it is a compromise. When 
you read a statute and say this doesn’t make any sense, it is not because 
the person drafting it did not know what he or she was doing; it is 
because it was not a he or she drafting; it was a they drafting it.  
So what does that mean? That means that the legislation’s precise 
terms were a compromise among multiple actors, and, as judges, if we 
 
4. Henry J. Friendly, Benchmarks 202 (1967) (presenting Justice 
Frankfurter’s “threefold imperative to law students”). 
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do not adhere to that compromise, if we do not adhere to the text of 
the provisions, we are really taking sides and upsetting the compromise 
that was reached in the legislative process. So functionalists have come 
to agree with the importance of the text. I want to emphasize that the 
text is not the end-all of statutory interpretation. But the statutory 
text is very important in determining how to resolve questions whether 
the agency has violated statutory constraints on it. 
Okay. So text is important. That is one thing we know, and I think 
people of all ideological stripes agree. But that still leaves the question, 
“How do we interpret the text?” It is not just read the words and what 
the words mean. There are a lot of canons or rules of construction that 
courts apply to help them interpret statutory text. There are semantic 
canons such as the canon of surplusage and the ejusdem generis canon. 
There are substantive canons that apply in cases of ambiguity or 
sometimes even may require us to depart from the text. Examples of 
substantive canons are the constitutional avoidance canon and the 
presumption against extraterritorial application. These canons reflect 
substantive values that are designed to reflect perceived congressional 
intent, and these canons are hugely important.  
To take just one example, last year there was a major case about 
the Alien Tort Statute in human rights litigation, and the presumption 
against extraterritorial application played a critical, really dispositive 
role in the Supreme Court’s resolution of that case.5 But even though 
there is widespread agreement now about the importance of the text, 
there is a lot of disagreement—uncertainty I would say—about some of 
the canons and how to apply them. Some of the venerable canons of 
statutory interpretation frankly are fairly questionable as reflections of 
perceived congressional intent. And this disagreement sometimes 
becomes a big problem in critical cases.  
Just consider the constitutional avoidance canon and the healthcare 
cases. Everyone is familiar with what happened generally in the 
healthcare cases, but I think most people think the main disagreement 
between Chief Justice Roberts on the one hand and the four dissenters 
on the other was on the question whether the Tax Clause justified the 
individual mandate. But if you look at the opinion and parse it closely, 
Chief Justice Roberts actually agreed with the dissenters that the 
individual mandate provision, as written, ordinarily could not be 
justified by the Tax Clause.6 So what happens? How do you reach the 
 
5. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013) 
(“‘[T]here is no clear indication of extraterritoriality here,’ and petitioners’ 
case seeking relief for violations of the law of nations occurring outside 
the United States is barred.” (quoting Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 
130 S. Ct. 2869, 2883 (2010))). 
6.  Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2594 (2012) (“[T]he 
Government asks us to read the mandate not as ordering individuals to 
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conclusion he did? Well, he went on to say that the statute could be 
construed not to impose a mandate but, rather, just a traditional tax 
incentive of the kind we have with regulatory taxes, cigarette taxes, the 
mortgage interest deduction, and other things like that in the Tax 
Code, and then he relied on the constitutional avoidance canon to 
interpret the individual mandate to not really be a mandate. So he said 
by interpreting it that way it will be constitutional. We will avoid the 
unconstitutionality that would otherwise exist with the statute as 
drafted.7 The dissenters disagreed. They argued that the constitutional 
avoidance canon was not so flexible so as to allow a judge to stretch 
the statute so far from its ordinary terms.8  
So in that case, we have agreement on basic constitutional 
principles between Chief Justice Roberts and the dissenters, really 
agreement on how to interpret the text as written. Where the 
disagreement came—and it is amazing that in a case of that magnitude 
and that importance and that significance—it came down to, “How do 
you apply the constitutional avoidance canon?” 
Consider also another canon, the surplusage canon. I won’t quiz 
you on that. The principle is that words in a statute should not be 
interpreted to be redundant of other words in the statute. But it turns 
out that members of Congress often want to be redundant. They want 
to be redundant. Why do they want to be redundant? Well, in the 
words of Shakespeare, they want to “make doubly sure.”9 They want 
to make doubly sure about things. And so oftentimes, just to make sure 
there is no doubt, Congress is intentionally redundant. A lot of legal 
drafting is redundant to make sure someone cannot wiggle out with 
arguing, “Well, if they meant that, they would have used clearer 
language.” In ordinary conversation, we use extra words to be “doubly 
sure,” and Congress does that as well.  
So why do courts continue to rely on the surplusage canon in 
interpreting statutes written by Congress? Good question, right? Good 
question. There is no great answer to that question. Given the realities 
of congressional drafting and ordinary language usage, courts should be 
more careful and discerning in applying the surplusage canon. 
 
buy insurance, but rather as imposing a tax . . . . The most 
straightforward reading of the mandate is that it commands individuals 
to purchase insurance.”). 
7.  Id. at 2597. 
8.  Id. at 2653–54 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting).  
9. William Shakespeare, Macbeth act 4, sc. 1 (Alan Durband, ed., 1984) 
(1623) (modern English translation) (referring to Macbeth’s plan to kill 
Macduff despite Macbeth’s misunderstanding that Macduff is not a threat 
to him). 
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So in matters of statutory interpretation, text is key. I think in the 
legal system—the judicial system—although there are lots of 
disagreements at the margins, there is a pretty broad consensus that 
the actual words of the statute are critical. But as judges, as lawyers, 
and as academics, one thing I have seen on the D.C. Circuit is we need 
to do a better job of reaching consensus on the canons we apply to 
interpret the text. Justice Scalia—not surprisingly, given his focus on 
this topic—and Bryan Garner got us started with a wonderful book 
that came out last year called Reading Law: the Interpretation of Legal 
Texts.10 Really, every lawyer should have that book because 
interpreting text is so central to what we all do as lawyers. Likewise, 
Professors Manning, William Eskridge Jr., and Abbe Gluck have all 
done wonderful work on statutory interpretation. 
But there is still too much uncertainty about the canons and too 
much uncertainty about how they apply in particular cases. So my 
thought for all of us—and especially the academics and the judges—is 
to work to ensure that the tools of interpretation are stable and 
consistent and that the rules of the road are agreed upon in advance. 
That is what we mean by rule of law. Ideally, the rules of the road 
would be agreed upon in advance so that they are not battled out and 
manipulated in the crucible of a controversial case. We made great 
progress in statutory interpretation, I think, over the last couple of 
decades—again, Justice Scalia deserves a lot of credit, and many others 
do as well—but we still have a ways to go, even with our shared 
grounding in the importance of the statutory text. 
B. Separation of Powers Cases 
A third aspect of the D.C. Circuit is the role of this court in 
resolving separation of powers cases, disputes that involve the 
respective powers of the legislative branch and executive branch under 
our constitutional system. 
The most recent, high-profile example from our court involved the 
Recess Appointments Clause and whether certain appointments by 
President Obama made during a congressional or a Senate recess were 
constitutionally permitted under the Recess Appointments Clause.11 
The Supreme Court has that case now, and it will hear arguments this 
winter and decide it presumably in the spring.12 But there have been 
 
10.  Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The 
Interpretation of Legal Texts (2012). 
11.  Canning v. NLRB, 705 F.3d 490 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 
2861 (2013).  
12. Since this lecture was delivered, the Supreme Court heard arguments in 
this case on January 13, 2014, and affirmed the D.C. Circuit, holding on 
June 26, 2014, that (1) recesses, under the Recess Appointments Clause, 
include intra-session recesses of substantial length; (2) the Recess 
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many others: the constitutionality of the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board; the cases in the 1990s challenging the Line Item Veto 
Act; the legislative veto challenge; and going back to the famous 
Youngstown Steel seizure cases. Cases of this kind come to the D.C. 
Circuit often.  
And how do we resolve these cases, the separation of powers cases? 
Well, it turns out that we often rely on the text again—the text of the 
Constitution in these kinds of cases. It turns out, if you look at the 
D.C. Circuit’s docket and the Supreme Court’s case law in this area, 
that text matters not only in statutory interpretation today, but it is 
also of significant value in constitutional interpretation. This is 
particularly true in separation of powers cases. So the observation that 
text matters is both normative and positive. Yes, this observation must 
be normative. The text of the Constitution is the supreme law of the 
land as Article VI says it is. It is not a set of aspirational ideas. The 
Constitution is law. One of Chief Justice Roberts’s primary points at 
his confirmation hearing was that the Constitution is law.13 It is a legal 
document, and this written law binds us as a nation. It binds us as 
judges, as legislators, as executive branch officials, and as citizens.  
To be sure, we are all aware that there is a debate as to the correct 
method for interpreting the Constitution between—to oversimplify 
significantly—living constitutionalists and what Justice Scalia might 
call enduring constitutionalists. And living constitutionalists argue that 
the Constitution is to be interpreted in light of contemporary standards 
of decency, according to the morals and consciences of the times as 
assessed by judges. They believe that the words of the Constitution are 
not to be read literally but flexibly in order to adapt to modern 
conditions so that we are not trapped by views of people who lived 200 
years ago.14 Again, I am oversimplifying, but you get the idea. Enduring 
constitutionalists believe that the Constitution is to be interpreted by 
judges according to its written terms. They believe that we should not 
strain to find ambiguity in clarity and that policy innovation should 
come through the legislative process to the extent not prohibited by the 
Constitution or, where necessary because legislation is prohibited, 
through the constitutional amendment process.15  
 
Appointments Clause permits appointments to vacancies that occurred 
before recesses; and (3) the recess appointments that President Obama 
made during the three-day period between two pro forma sessions of the 
Senate were invalid. NLRB v. Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2577–78 (2014). 
13. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be 
Chief Justice of the United States, 109th Cong. 56 (2005) (statement of 
John G. Roberts).   
14. Scalia & Garner, supra note 10, at 432.  
15. Id. at 427, 432.  
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So we have a debate between living constitutionalists and enduring 
constitutionalists. But no matter how one resolves that debate in cases 
involving, say, the Equal Protection Clause, the Due Process Clause, 
or the First Amendment—those somewhat open-ended provisions of the 
Constitution—it turns out that judges of all stripes on the Supreme 
Court and on the D.C. Circuit pay close attention to the precise words 
of the constitutional text in separation of powers cases. Let me give you 
a few examples from the Supreme Court. Again, the point here is that, 
in separation-of-powers cases, it turns out that text matters—the 
precise text.  
Powell v. McCormack16 is a case from 1969 at the height of the 
Warren Court. And the question was whether the House of 
Representatives could exclude a representative who had been reelected, 
Adam Clayton Powell, from the seat to which he had been elected.17 
The text of the Constitution lists three qualifications for being a House 
Member: age of twenty-five; seven years as a citizen; and living in the 
state from which the representative is elected.18 So the question is 
whether Congress could exclude an elected member, even though the 
member met those qualifications. Could Congress essentially have a 
good morals kind of addition or good behavior kind of addition as a 
qualification to someone who had been elected to the House of 
Representatives? Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote the opinion of the 
court for seven justices, and he conducted an intensive analysis of the 
Constitution’s text and history, the convention debates, and the 
ratification debates. It was the kind of textual and historical analysis 
that would make Justice Scalia smile. And the Court finds, says Chief 
Justice Warren, that its analysis demonstrated that “in judging the 
qualifications of its members Congress is limited to the standing 
qualifications prescribed in the Constitution.”19 The text matters, said 
Chief Justice Warren.  
Another good example is the Court’s 1983 decision in INS v. 
Chadha20—a very important case about the respective balance of power 
between the legislative and executive branches. The precise issue was 
the constitutionality of the legislative veto.21 Legislative vetoes were 
provisions that Congress put in legislation in the wake of the New Deal 
that would usually mean one or both Houses of Congress could vote 
down a particular agency action without going through the whole 
legislative process again and without having the President sign the law. 
 
16. 395 U.S. 486 (1969). 
17.  Id. at 489.  
18.  U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 2. 
19.  Powell, 395 U.S. at 550. 
20.  462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
21.  Id. at 929.  
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What this would do is allow Congress to give broad delegations of 
authority to executive agencies, but then—say if the House doesn’t like 
what the FCC does—the House alone could pass a legislative veto, and 
not go through all three required entities that have to participate in 
the legislative process.  
So where did the legislative veto come from? These expert agencies 
had to have broad delegations given to them—at least that was the 
thought—so they could tackle changing problems. The legislative veto 
was a way to preserve some congressional check on what agencies did. 
The legal basis was that things have changed since the founding, so we 
should not be bound by the text of the Bicameralism and Presentment 
Clauses.  
So the idea seemed sensible to some as a policy matter. It was 
considered a sensible accommodation to the rise of the New Deal state. 
It worked for many years, and when it got to the Supreme Court some 
forty years after it started being used significantly, what did the 
Supreme Court say? The Supreme Court said no.22 Listen to the Court’s 
words. This is written by Chief Justice Warren Burger and joined by 
Justice William Brennan, among others. So the opinion represented a 
real cross-section ideologically of the Supreme Court. The Court said 
that “[some] undertake[] to make a case for the proposition that the 
one-House veto is a useful political invention.”23 The policy argument 
“supporting even useful ‘political inventions’ are subject to the demands 
of the Constitution which defines powers and, with respect to this 
subject, sets out just how those powers are to be exercised.”24 “[T]he 
prescription for legislative action in Art. I, §§ 1, 7, represents the 
Framers’ decision that the legislative power of the Federal Government 
be exercised in accord with a single, finally wrought and exhaustively 
considered, procedure.”25 Text matters, the Supreme Court said. It did 
not matter that it was a good policy invention. It did not matter that 
Congress believed this was a way to resolve problems better than the 
system set up by the Framers.  
Consider similarly Clinton v. City of New York,26 a Line Item Veto 
case decided in 1998. This is in some ways a mirror image of the 
legislative veto. The statute allowed the President to sign part of the 
bill and to essentially excise parts of the bill that he disliked.27 So when 
 
22.  Id. at 959.  
23.  Id. at 945. 
24.  Id.  
25.  Id. at 951. 
26.  524 U.S. 417 (1998). 
27.  See id. at 436 (“The Line Item Veto Act gives the President the power to 
‘cancel in whole’ three types of provisions that have been signed into law: 
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the President is presented with a bill that has lots of things, the 
President could, in essence, line out parts of the bill the President 
disliked. Again, in the Constitution, we have a specific procedure for 
how legislation gets enacted. So was this consistent with the 
Constitution? And the idea here, similarly, was this is a sensible 
accommodation to the practical realities of governing in the modern age 
and, in particular—and this will sound familiar, today—to the 
budgetary problems of the United States. Congress was putting in too 
many spending projects that were too parochial, essentially log rolling; 
and there were projects that would help this member and that member, 
and they would increase the federal deficit too greatly. 
So this Line Item Veto would allow the President, the national 
figure, to line out those pork-barrel kinds of projects. But the Supreme 
Court again said no, this time in an opinion by Justice John Paul 
Stevens, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Clarence 
Thomas, among others. So, again, an ideological cross-section of the 
Supreme Court struck down the attempt by the legislative and 
executive branches to evade the bicameralism and presentment 
requirements. The Court stated Congress cannot alter the procedure 
set out in Article I, Section 7 without amending the Constitution.28 
Text matters.  
I could go on. There are other—many other—separation of powers 
cases just like this: Buckley v. Valeo,29 on the composition of the Federal 
Election Commission and how it was going to regulate campaign 
finance activities; Bowsher v. Synar;30 the Free Enterprise case.31 They 
all highlight the primacy of the constitutional text, and they reaffirm 
that the constitutional text is critical in separation of powers cases.  
A lot of separation of powers cases never even make it to the 
Supreme Court or any court, right? A lot of separation of powers 
disputes are resolved in the executive and legislative branches 
themselves, and, when you are in the executive branch or when you are 
in the legislative branch, it turns out that you pay great attention to 
the precise words of the constitutional text.  
Rather than giving you legal stories about that, I will give you one 
anecdote that I thought underscored it for me. When I was going 
through my Senate confirmation process, I would meet with individual 
 
‘(1) any dollar amount of discretionary budget authority; (2) any item of 
new direct spending; or (3) any limited tax benefit.’”). 
28.  Id. at 449.  
29.  424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
30.  478 U.S. 714 (1986). 
31.  Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138 
(2010) (holding that dual limitations on the President’s ability to remove 
PCAOB officers, who exercised executive power, violated the separation 
of powers). 
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senators, who were willing to meet with me to talk or who wanted to 
meet with me to talk about my nomination. One of them was Senator 
Robert Byrd of West Virginia, who is a legendary senator, a great 
expert in senate procedure and a great expert in separation of powers. 
So I was very nervous about meeting Senator Byrd. He was very 
accommodating. He got me in there, and the first thing he said to me 
was, “Tell me about your family.” I said, “Well, “I am married, and I 
have a daughter.” And he said, “Oh, how old is your daughter?” I said, 
“She is one.” He said, “I have two daughters. Sixty-eight and sixty-
four.” You know, I was thinking, “Yes, he has been here a long, long 
time, old Senator Byrd.” But then, after the pleasantries, he pulled out 
the text of his Constitution. And I had been properly prepared. So I 
pulled out my text to my Constitution, still the same one I have today, 
and—this will not surprise anyone who knows about Senator Byrd or 
anyone who thinks about what is going on today—he read to me Article 
I, Section 9 on Congress’ power of the purse, Congress’ control over 
appropriations. He was a legendary appropriator who kept close reins 
on the appropriations process in the United States Senate. He also asked 
me about the War Powers Clauses and about the Establishment Clause. 
But why did he pull out his text? Because the text matters in day-to-
day life in the House, the Senate, and the presidency. And it turns out 
to be the same in separation of powers cases in the courts. So one thing 
you see, again, in a third aspect of the D.C. Circuit, is that 
constitutional text matters. Whatever your view about how to interpret 
the Constitution, say, in the Due Process Clause, the Equal Protection 
Clause, the Establishment Clause, or the Free Speech Clause, those 
more open-ended provisions, when it comes to the separation of powers 
cases, for the courts, the Congress, the precise text of the Constitution 
matters.  
C. War Powers Cases 
My fourth and final point today about the D.C. Circuit relates to 
the most serious cases we have to resolve, and those are war powers 
cases. So, in wartime, as in statutory interpretation generally, we want 
rules of the road ahead of time to avoid the potential for political 
manipulation in the heat of a particular controversy. That is what we 
want with judicial confirmations. That is what we want with statutory 
interpretation. That is what we want with constitutional interpretation. 
Now, that is what we really need in wartime cases.  
Lives and liberties depend on how courts resolve wartime cases, and 
the courts have an important role in national security cases. The 
Supreme Court from Youngstown32 in the 1950s to Boumediene,33 the 
case about the Guantanamo detainees in 2008, has been involved in 
 
32.  Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
33.  Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
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national security cases. And then our court, the D.C. Circuit, has 
played a critical role in the last several years. We have had all the 
Guantanamo cases—cases on detention at Guantanamo, and also about 
military commissions trials of certain Guantanamo detainees who 
allegedly committed war crimes. So what have I seen there? What has 
happened in those wartime cases?  
Some argue that courts should not even be involved. What are the 
courts doing in national security cases? But, at least in cases where 
there is standing, where there has been somebody who has been injured, 
staying out of the case altogether would mean excessive deference to 
the executive. It would mean the executive wins notwithstanding any 
statute or constitutional provision that might not countenance what 
the executive is doing. It would upset the balance of powers among the 
branches to simply give a blank check to the executive in those cases. 
And that is why the Supreme Court has not refrained from hearing 
those cases. That is why the Supreme Court did not do that in Justice 
Jackson’s famous opinion in Youngstown, where he said to President 
Harry Truman: No, you may not seize the steel mills. I know that you 
believe it is important to the war effort, and I know you are the 
Commander in Chief. But no, you cannot do that under our 
constitutional system given the statutes that have been passed that 
preclude that.34 That’s the lesson of the Supreme Court’s 2006 decision 
in Hamdan35: Yes, Mr. President, it is important, we understand, to 
have military commission trials of al Qaeda war criminals, but you have 
to follow the rules in the statute, and we do not interpret those rules in 
the statute to allow the war crimes trials to proceed in this fashion.36  
Even in the high stakes of wartime, what you see from the Supreme 
Court and what you see from the D.C. Circuit is that courts apply the 
ordinary rules of interpretation—the ordinary rules of statutory 
interpretation and the ordinary rules of constitutional interpretation. 
Of course, in this new war with al Qaeda—not so new anymore but 
twelve years old, but new compared to the kind of war that we have 
had historically, with people in uniforms and people who fight in the 
open as opposed to engage in terrorism—some people come from the 
other direction. They say the courts should be creating new rules to 
constrain the executive—that this new kind of war requires new rules 
created by the courts. Some people say, for example, there is a long-
 
34.  See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 655 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“With all its 
defects, delays and inconveniences, men have discovered no technique for 
long preserving free government except that the Executive be under the 
law, and that the law be made by parliamentary deliberations.”). 
35.  Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
36.  See id. at 635 (“But in undertaking to try Hamdan and subject him to 
criminal punishment, the Executive is bound to comply with the rule of 
law that prevails in this jurisdiction.”). 
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standing principle justifying detention until the end of hostilities, but 
that principle doesn’t make sense in this kind of war that could go on 
forever. 
Our court, the D.C. Circuit, has responded to these kinds of pleas 
by saying we are not going to relax the constitutional principles or 
statutes that regulate the executive, but we are also not going to take 
on the role of creating new rules to regulate the executive. If there are 
to be new rules to govern the executive in this kind of war, they need 
to be created in the usual way by the Congress of the United States or 
imposed by the executive branch on itself. These new rules should not 
be created by the courts.  
So you see from our case law and the Supreme Court’s case law in 
wartime two principles. We should not expect courts to relax the old 
constitutional or statutory rules that constrain the executive. At the 
same time, we should not expect courts to make up new rules in order 
to constrain the executive. Statutes are very important to wartime 
decisions. Contrary to the belief of some, there are lots of statutes that 
regulate how the executive conducts war, and it turns out that courts 
interpret and apply the statutes in this area just like they do in other 
areas.  
On this wartime issue going forward, what could be improved? It 
just seems especially important for me, having observed this from now 
the judicial perspective, that Congress write the rules clearly and 
update them to make them clearer, when necessary. It is also essential 
for courts to be as consistent as we possibly can and to be able to 
interpret the laws according to settled and consistent principles of 
interpretation. You cannot always achieve that on all fronts, but it is 
possible to try. In wartime cases, it is especially important, I think, for 
courts to be as consistent as possible, and not pull the rug out from 
under the executive branch when it has relied on what the courts have 
said before. 
Conclusion 
So I come from Washington. I talked about four aspects of the D.C. 
Circuit. You look at Washington today with the shutdown, as I said at 
the start, and it is not a day that you are really optimistic about the 
nature of our government, but I want to close, at least, with a story of 
optimism. I think history gives us reason for confidence in the ability 
of the government to handle crises and to handle difficult times. So the 
Youngstown case was a terrible loss for President Truman, just a 
horrible political loss to get embarrassed by the Supreme Court in this 
way and to lose the case in the Supreme Court. All of the justices had 
been nominated by either President Truman or President Roosevelt. 
There was no partisan angle to this decision. There was a you-have-
violated-the-law angle to this decision. 
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Shortly thereafter, Justice Hugo Black—I guess things worked a 
little differently back then—invited President Truman and all the other 
justices to his house for dinner. This seems awkward to us today, and 
it must have been awkward even then, but eventually President 
Truman broke the tension by saying, “Hugo, I don’t care much for your 
law, but this Bourbon is good.” So his comment, real or apocryphal, 
shows the respect that the three branches of government can have for 
each other and especially for the judiciary’s ultimate responsibility to 
interpret and enforce the Constitution. At a time when civility in 
Washington and functioning government in Washington appear to be 
not exactly going well, I think we can all take inspiration from our 
democracy’s history of dealing with challenging and controversial cases. 
Thank you again for the invitation to Case Western Reserve School 
of Law. Thank you for the opportunity to speak as part of this 
wonderful lecture series, which I am happy to be part of. I am happy 
to answer questions that people have. Thank you. 
Answers to Audience Questions37  
On Rules of Interpretation and Canons of Construction 
Q: You talked about some of the principles of interpretation and 
construction. We studied many of those in law school, all of us. There 
are a lot of them, including principles of constraint and deference. 
Sometimes it makes you think that a judge who would want to decide 
an issue or to decide it a certain way could find and invoke principles 
to support his preference. As a judge, how do you stay grounded in 
principle as opposed to outcome oriented? 
A: Good question. First of all, for the problem you foresee, that is 
why I think the bench, the bar, and academia need to constantly be 
improving on the rules of interpretation—the canons of construction—
so that they are more settled and so that you are not manipulating 
them in the course of a particular case. We want stable rules of the 
road. This is something I just feel strongly about in all sorts of areas 
and tried to describe today. Stable rules of the road help prevent us 
from allowing our personal feelings about a particular issue to dictate 
how we are going to resolve a case. If you have a case where I have 
canon A or canon B and I really would love for canon A to apply 
because that would make me feel better about the result in this case, 
that’s not good. So we need more clarity about how the canons of 
construction apply. This is why Justice Scalia took on his mammoth 
project with this canons-of-construction book. And I am not saying 
everyone, and he admits not everyone may agree with how he describes 
the canons. But the point is that the statutory text is only first base.  
37. Editor’s Note: Audience questions have been edited for clarity and 
grammar.  
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Now, we have to move to the canons of construction and try to agree 
on those. 
And your question relates to one of the reasons why the Senate 
confirmation process is kind of brutal. That is why Senators look at 
your background. “Gee, you worked in the White House. How are you 
going to be when an executive branch case comes up?” That is why it 
is tough sometimes to make it through because once you are there, you 
are there for life. What a huge responsibility. The Senate wants to find 
people with backgrounds where they have demonstrated an ability to 
follow the law, even when it hurts them, and an ability to follow the 
law even when it leads to a result they dislike. That is the kind of 
person we would hope would make it through. And, again, making the 
rules more settled would help with the process once they are there. 
 
On the President Choosing Not to Enforce the Law 
Q: It seems like, in recent years, the executive branch has issued 
signing statements interpreting the law in their own way. But, I think 
many people have felt that in some cases, if not in most, these signing 
statements were not an interpretation of the law but the negation of 
the law and a sort of declaration that the law would be ignored. In the 
face of this, what recourse does the judicial branch have to uphold the 
law? 
A: So, just as background, when Congress passes a law and a future 
President comes in thinking that law is unconstitutional—or the 
current President thinks the law is unconstitutional—and decides not 
to follow those provisions, that is a traditional exercise of power by 
Presidents.  
You asked what recourse does someone have? Well, if someone is 
hurt—the term of art is that they have an injury in fact that grants 
them standing—by the fact that the President is not following the 
statute, then someone can file a suit and argue that the President has 
to follow the statute as passed by Congress. And ultimately, a case like 
that will come to the judiciary. An example in recent years—not one 
that gets much attention, though—Congress passed a law that said if 
you are born in Jerusalem, your passport has to say Jerusalem, Israel.38 
President Bush said that’s unconstitutional. It intrudes upon the 
Constitution’s assignment of the recognition power, the power to 
recognize foreign governments, to the President. President Obama 
agreed with President Bush. He is not following that law either. And 
the case went to the Supreme Court.39 First, the Supreme Court ruled 
 
38.  Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 107-
228, § 214(d), 116 Stat. 1350, 1366 (2003). 
39.  Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421 (2012). 
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that the courts had a role in resolving it. It went up there to determine 
whether this is a political question that the courts should stay out of, 
consistent with what I was talking about earlier. The Supreme Court, 
per Chief Justice Roberts, said no, we can resolve this case. But they 
didn’t resolve it.40 They just said that federal courts can resolve it and 
then remanded it back to the lower courts to do so.41 And so on remand 
our court, the D.C. Circuit—I was not on the case—has ruled, in fact, 
that the President does have the exclusive recognition power in this 
case, and, therefore, the statute does violate the Constitution.42  
That is an example where there was a court case where someone 
was able to argue that the President has to follow the statute and is 
acting unlawfully by not doing so. There are other examples like that. 
Now, there are some where there is no one who has standing, and it 
can never get to court. That presents its own set of challenges. In those 
cases where no one can get to court, really it is Congress who has to 
take action, and one of Congress’ two big tools of action, we all know, 
is shutting down the confirmation process or using that as a tool of 
retaliation against the President. And the other is, as we have seen 
today, that Congress can refuse to appropriate money to allow the 
government to operate or to shut down particular aspects of the 
executive branch. 
 
On Interpreting the Words of the Constitution 
Q: You mentioned a term also about being bound by the 
Constitution of 200 years. So how do we apply this if we are not going 
to be bound by the Constitution of what was written in 200 years ago 
as a loose constructionist or strict constructionist?  
A: Well, I think my basic point was that in separation of powers 
cases all of the justices tend to agree that the words of the document 
are law, and they do bind us more. And so they are different than these 
open-ended provisions like the Due Process Clause or the Equal 
Protection Clause. I think my point was that no one can believe the 
hype that the words of the document do not matter. Believe that the 
words of the document do matter, particularly in separation of powers 
cases and, again, recognize that some of the provisions are so open 
 
40.  Id. at 1430.  
41.  Id. at 1431.  
42. See Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 725 F.3d 197, 214 (D.C. Cir. 
2013), petition for cert. filed, 2013 WL 6140526 (U.S. Nov. 20, 2013) (No. 
13-628) (“Having reviewed the Constitution’s text and structure, Supreme 
Court precedent and longstanding post-ratification history, we conclude 
that the President exclusively holds the power to determine whether to 
recognize a foreign sovereign.”). 
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ended that they have been interpreted so as to reflect contemporary 
standards of decency and the like—the Eighth Amendment, the Due 
Process Clause, and what have you. 
 
On the Hastings Impeachment Case 
Q: Can you talk about the Hastings impeachment case?43 
A: So in the judicial impeachment cases, the Supreme Court 
ruled—interpreting the text of the Constitution—that impeachment 
trials are exclusively committed to the Senate because the Senate, under 
the Constitution, has the sole power to try impeachments.44 The House 
has the sole power to impeach. The Senate has the sole power to try 
impeachments. So the Supreme Court in that area, which is one highly 
unusual area of our Constitution, has said the Senate has the final word 
on whether someone was convicted of an impeachable offense or not. 
And in the Supreme Court on those impeachment cases, the argument 
was, “Well, how can we allow the Senate to have the final word? What 
if they just flipped a coin?” And Justice Scalia, always quick on his 
feet, said “What if we went back there, the nine of us, and just flipped 
a coin?” In other words, someone has to have the final word in a case 
like that, and, reading the text of the Constitution, in the Walter Nixon 
case, the Supreme Court said the Senate has the final word on those 
cases. 
 
On Executive Control over Regulatory Agencies 
Q: It has been argued that over the past twenty years we have seen 
increased centralization of control over regulatory agencies by the 
executive branch and the White House, in particular. And I am 
wondering if you think that observation or claim is correct, and, if so, 
if it has implications for the job of the D.C. Circuit, given that it is the 
primary court for reviewing the actions of federal regulatory agencies.  
A: I think it is hard to generalize on that. I think with certain 
agencies, yes. Certain agencies, maybe not. It also depends on what the 
particular President cares about and focuses on. So, I think it is hard 
to generalize on whether the President has more or less control over a 
particular agency. I do think, as you know, there are two categories of 
agencies. There are executive agencies that the President has direct 
supervisory control over, and then there are so-called independent 
agencies, over which the President does not have direct supervisory 
 
43. Hastings v. U.S. Senate, 887 F.2d 332 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (per curiam). 
44. See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 230–31 (1993) (“The 
commonsense meaning of the word ‘sole’ is that the Senate alone shall 
have authority to determine whether an individual should be acquitted or 
convicted.”). 
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control. And there is an argument that has been made that courts 
should be more wary of regulations adopted by independent agencies 
because those have not been supervised by the President in the way 
that our constitutional structure would suggest. And, for purposes of 
accountability, that the courts should exercise more review authority 
over independent agencies. That position, as yet, has not been adopted 
by the courts, but I do think the question of presidential supervision 
does have implications for the role of the court. My view in the Free 
Enterprise case was that the President constitutionally does have an 
important role in the administrative process.45 The President on many 
occasions—whether it be President Bush, President Obama, or 
President Clinton—would dictate what the agency should do; he would 
be very involved. The agency would not do anything of significance 
without checking in with the President beforehand.  
 
45.  See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 
667, 685–715 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board’s structure unconstitutionally 
restricts the President’s appointment and removal powers), aff’d in part, 
rev’d in part, 130 S. Ct. 3188 (2010). 
